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ABSTRACT. This paper examines a California-based microgrid’s decision to invest in a 
distributed generation (DG) unit fuelled by natural gas.   While the long-term natural gas 
generation cost is stochastic, we initially assume that the microgrid may purchase electricity at a 
fixed retail rate from its utility.  Using the real options approach, we find a natural gas 
generation cost threshold that triggers DG investment.  Furthermore, the consideration of 
operational flexibility by the microgrid increases DG investment, while the option to disconnect 
from the utility is not attractive.  By allowing the electricity price to be stochastic, we next 
determine an investment threshold boundary and find that high electricity price volatility relative 
to that of natural gas generation cost delays investment while simultaneously increasing the 
value of the investment.  We conclude by using this result to find the implicit option value of the 
DG unit when two sources of uncertainty exist. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of deregulated electricity sectors is to improve economic efficiency by providing 
market signals to participants (see [1]).  In competitive electricity markets, both producers and 
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consumers should make decisions better suited to their circumstances than those in the regulated 
paradigm.  Traditionally, the viewpoint was that the electricity sector exhibits characteristics of a 
“natural monopoly,” i.e., costs that decline with output.  This necessitated a vertically integrated 
structure with franchise monopolies operating in distinct regions.  Such an industrial structure, 
however, turned the potentially competitive generation function of the sector into a de facto 
monopoly.  Indeed, little evidence exists that large generation companies are necessary to 
achieve economies of scale (see [2]).  Due to the observed inefficiencies of this structure, such as 
low capital and labour productivity, a gap between retail and wholesale prices, and poor energy 
efficiency because of heat and distribution losses (see [3]), many jurisdictions have deregulated 
their electricity sectors over the past twenty years.  In a broad sense, these measures have kept 
functions with “natural monopoly” characteristics, such as distribution and transmission, under 
the control of regulatory agencies, while opening up the generation and retailing functions to 
competition.  As with other sectors of the economy, greater efficiency may then be achieved by 
matching demand and supply in a decentralised fashion such that consumers and producers make 
decisions based on their own utility- and profit-maximising objectives. 
 
By potentially providing high-resolution price signals to market participants, electricity market 
restructuring may also enable the emergence of microgrids, which are energy sources and sinks 
that normally operate in parallel with the grid, but which can function as islands. To do so, a 
microgrid must apply local on-site control and will contain one of (or a combination of) the 
following: fossil- or biomass-fired distributed generation (DG) units possibly with combined 
heat and power (CHP) applications matched to non-electrical energy requirements such as 
building heating and/or cooling, demand control, or local renewable harvesting (see [4]).  
Facilitated by such exposure to price signals and a favourable regulatory regime, a greater 
proportion of electricity generation may then take place closer to loads than in the familiar 
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centralised, regulated paradigm (see [5]).  Although microgrids were historically a response to 
reliability issues and transmission constraints, they now also have an economic imperative due to 
the possibility of financial incentives, e.g., avoiding energy purchases during peak periods and/or 
creation of carbon credits.  Thus, microgrids utilising small-scale, on-site DG offer tangible 
benefits stemming from the possibility of lower-cost electricity and greater system energy 
efficiency along with a lower carbon footprint derived from CHP applications. Additionally, 
microgrids may offer “qualitative” improvements, such as power quality and reliability (PQR) 
more customised to end-use requirements and improved prospects for the adoption of small-
scale renewable energy technologies.  PQR benefits are characterised as “qualitative” here not 
because they are without genuine economic value, but rather because methods for incorporating 
their contribution to microgrid value streams are currently rudimentary.  Nevertheless, 
considerable regulatory barriers currently inhibit more widespread adoption of DG, ranging from 
poorly defined and enforced interconnection standards to tariff components such as standby 
charges and exit fees.  Ample research and folklore exists on the struggles that self-generators 
face when trying to coexist in the power system with enormous entrenched electricity utilities 
(see [6]).  However, we focus here on solely the economics of DG investment by a microgrid 
facing risk from uncertain electricity and fuel prices.   
 
From a microgrid’s perspective, making investment and operational decisions concerning DG 
units should involve an assessment of the uncertainty in both electricity and fuel prices.  While 
the former are largely fixed in the case of utility-provided time-of-use (TOU) tariffs, the latter 
may exhibit considerable volatility, being typically subject to monthly procurement cost 
revision.  A microgrid should, therefore, account for this uncertainty when making investment 
and operational decisions.  Whereas in previous studies we have strived to model the economics 
and thermodynamics of a microgrid in a detailed, but purely deterministic, setting (see, for 
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example, [7], [8], and [9]), here, we incorporate randomness into our analysis, thereby 
necessitating abstraction from some real-world considerations.1  Specifically, in this paper, we 
examine the problem of a California-based2 microgrid via the real options approach to determine 
fuel cost thresholds below which it is optimal for the microgrid to install DG.  We next extend 
the basic model to allow for operational flexibility and also evaluate the option to disconnect 
entirely from the utility.  Finally, we permit the electricity price to be stochastic in order to 
examine its impact on the microgrid’s investment decision.  Where possible, we contrast the 
results yielded by the real options approach with those implied by a traditional, deterministic 
discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. 
 
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
We assume that a microgrid has a constant electric load,3 
8760
Q  (kWe), that it must serve via 
either utility purchases or a DG unit in which it has the discretion to invest.  The turnkey cost of 
the DG unit, I (US$), is deterministic and includes all purchase, shipping, and installation costs.  
For now, we assume a deterministic utility electricity price, P  (US$/kWhe), whereas the long-
term natural gas generation cost, C  (US$/kWhe),4 evolves according to a geometric Brownian 
motion (GBM) process as follows (see [11]): 
                                                 
1 A related paper investigates sequential DG and CHP investment strategies under uncertainty (see [10]). 
2 The California case is compelling not only because of the state’s efforts with deregulation and cost-reflective retail 
tariff rates for electricity, but also because of its large agricultural, commercial, and industrial energy base.  
Furthermore, the state has several DG subsidy programmes funded both by the California Public Utilities 
Commission, e.g., the California Self-Generation Incentive Program, and the California Energy Commission, e.g., 
the Rebate Program for Wind & Fuel Cell Renewable Energy Electric-Generating Systems.   
3 The constant-load assumption may be relaxed without complicating the analysis as long as the load remains 
deterministic.  Indeed, as long as the conditional expected cash flows may be calculated, e.g., by integration, then 
including time-varying loads poses no technical difficulty.  However, for clarity of exposition and in order to 
explain the intuition behind the microgrid’s decision-making under uncertainty, we avoid this real-world feature. 
4 This is calculated by multiplying the natural gas fuel cost (US$/kWh) by the heat rate (kWh/kWhe) of the DG unit.  
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CdzCdtdC σα +=                                                         (1) 
This implies that successive percentage changes in C  are independent of each other, which is a 
reasonable model for the long-term evolution of commodity prices (see [12]).  Consequently, the 
natural gas generation cost at time t given the initial cost, 0C , is lognormally distributed with 
mean teC α0 .  Here, α  is the annual growth rate of C , σ  is the annual volatility of C , and dz is 
the increment to a standard Wiener process.  We additionally define the annual real risk-free 
interest rate as r  and let δ  be the convenience yield associated with natural gas generation, i.e., 
the risk-adjusted rate of return on natural gas generation minus its growth rate.  Intuitively, this 
is the opportunity cost of retaining the option to invest.  For a financial call option, δ  is the 
forgone dividend.  Finally, we assume that once the DG unit is installed, its effective lifetime is 
infinite due to the possibility of maintenance upgrades.  This simplification is further justified by 
the fact that the discrepancy between the present value (PV) of a perpetuity and the PV of an 
annuity decreases with the length of the time horizon.  For example, if the actual lifetime of a 
DG unit is thirty years, then the ratio of the latter to the former per dollar for 04.0=δ  is 
( ) 6917.01
11 30 =+− δ .   
 
Given price uncertainty and managerial flexibility, we use the real options approach (see [13]) to 
model the microgrid’s decision-making.  This approach is appropriate because it trades off in 
continuous time the PV of benefits from immediate investment with its associated costs.  
Specifically, the real options approach includes not only the tangible investment costs such as 
the turnkey cost, but also the opportunity cost of exercising the option to invest, which is the loss 
of the discretion to wait for more information.  Indeed, at times, it may be better to retain the 
                                                                                                                                                             
For example, the 500 kWe DG unit considered in this paper has a heat rate of 3.01.  If the price of natural gas is 
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option to invest even for a project that is “in the money” from the DCF perspective.  Analogous 
to the pricing of financial call options (see [14]), the real options approach constructs a risk-free 
portfolio using a short position on the underlying asset and then equates its expected 
appreciation (net of any dividend payments) to the instantaneous risk-free rate that could have 
been earned by investing in the portfolio.  For a perpetual option, the resulting partial differential 
equation (PDE) from this “no arbitrage” condition becomes an ordinary differential equation 
(ODE), which is solved analytically using boundary conditions.  As part of the solution, an 
investment threshold price for the underlying asset is obtained, at which investment is triggered.  
If an investment opportunity also offers embedded options, such as the discretion to abandon or 
to suspend and re-start production, then the approach is still valid, but may not yield closed-form 
analytical solutions.  Nevertheless, the threshold prices and resulting option values may be 
obtained numerically.   
 
Of course, as with any quantitative approach, the real options one has its limitations.  In 
particular, the assumption that a risk-free portfolio may be constructed does not apply in some 
commodities markets.  Furthermore, the price process may not be exogenous, nor may the 
parameters governing asset price dynamics be constant.  The first issue is usually avoided by 
trading a surrogate underlying commodity that is closely related to the one in question, whereas 
the second may be addressed by modelling the industry equilibrium (see [15]).  As natural gas, 
the fuel for the DG unit we consider, is widely traded, the first issue is not relevant.  And, since 
we take the perspective of a microgrid, i.e., a market participant small enough not to have any 
impact on the equilibrium price, the second issue is also not of concern here.  The third issue 
(pertaining to asset price parameters) is important and should be accounted for using a stochastic 
volatility model (see [16]).  However, since the purpose of this paper is to illustrate the 
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microgrid’s behaviour under uncertainty, the additional insight provided by stochastic volatility 
is approximated by doing sensitivity analysis on the volatility parameter.  In Section 3.3, we also 
consider a case with stochastic electricity prices, but we first turn to the base case with a fixed 
electricity price.    
 
3. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
3.1. Case 1:  Option to Invest 
We first consider a simple case in which the microgrid has the option to invest in a 500 kWe DG 
unit without any operational flexibility.  Specifically, assume that there are two states of the 
world:  one in which the microgrid holds the option to invest in DG and the other in which it has 
exercised the option to meet its load solely from on-site generation.  In the former situation, the 
microgrid receives no incremental electricity cost savings, and in the latter, its present value of 
cost savings is 
rQ
XC
r
P +− δ  per kWhe, which is simply the difference between two perpetuities 
plus the PV of the savings from avoiding the utility customer fee.  Note that the natural gas 
generation cost is discounted using the risk-adjusted convenience yield to account for the 
uncertainty in C .  Here, X  (in US$) is the annual customer charge paid to the utility.  For the 
San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) utility, this was approximately US$50 per month in the 
year 2000, which implies 600=X .    
 
Letting ( )CV0  be the value per kWhe of the option to invest and ( ) rQ
XC
r
PCV +−= δ1  be the 
expected PV per kWhe of the microgrid’s cost savings with DG installation, we now construct a 
risk-free portfolio, Φ , consisting of one unit of ( )CV0  and short ( )CV0′  units of natural gas 
(kWhe equivalent).  By equating the instantaneous risk-free return on an investment of amount 
Φ  to the expected appreciation of Φ  less any dividend payments, we obtain: 
8 
[ ] ( )dtCVCdEdtr 0′−Φ=Φ δ                                               (2) 
In order to simplify the right-hand side of Eq. (2), we first note that: 
( ) ( )
( )dCCVdVd
CVCCV
00
00
′−=Φ⇒
′−=Φ
                                               (3) 
Next, we apply Itô’s Lemma to obtain:  
( ) ( )( )2000 2
1 dCCVdCCVdV ′′+′=                                                  (4) 
By substituting Eq. (4) into Eq. (3) and taking expectations, we obtain: 
( )( )
[ ] ( )( )
[ ] ( ) dtCCVdE
dCCVEdE
dCCVd
22
0
2
0
2
0
2
1
2
1
2
1
σ′′=Φ⇒
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ′′=Φ⇒
′′=Φ
                                              (5) 
Finally, we substitute Eq. (5) into the right-hand side of Eq. (2) and re-arrange to obtain the 
following ODE: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
2
1
000
22 =−′−+′′ CrVCVCrCVC δσ                                  (6) 
Applying the boundary condition5 ( ) 0lim 0 =∞→ CVC , the solution to Eq. (6) is: 
( ) 220 βCACV =                                                    (7) 
Here, 02 >A  and ( ) ( ) 022
1
2
1
2
2
222 <+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−−−= σσ
δ
σ
δβ rrr  are constants, with 2A  to be 
determined endogenously.6  Note that Eq. (7) implies that the value of the option to invest is 
                                                 
5 This boundary condition implies that the option to invest becomes worthless as the natural gas generation cost 
increases without bound. 
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high when the natural gas generation cost is low.  Using the following value-matching and 
smooth-pasting conditions, we solve for 2A  and the investment threshold cost, IC : 
( ) ( )
Q
ICVCV II −= 10                                                    (8) 
( ) ( )II CVCV 10 ′=′                                                      (9) 
Equation (8) states that upon exercise, the microgrid receives a cash flow equal to the PV from 
an installed DG unit minus the investment cost.  As for Eq. (9), it is a first-order condition that 
equates the marginal benefit of delaying investment (stemming from more information about the 
natural gas price) with the marginal cost of delaying investment (due to a lower PV) at the point 
of exercise;  indeed, if they do not equate, then the holder of the option would be better off 
exercising it either earlier or later.   
 
The parameters for this and subsequent cases (unless otherwise indicated) are given in Table 1 
and correspond roughly to the situation for a microgrid in the service territory of the SDG&E 
utility during the year 2000 (see [9]).  Using these data, we find that 2405.42 −=β , while the 
closed-form solutions to Eqs. (8) and (9) reveal that  077334.0
12
2 =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−= Q
I
rQ
X
r
PCI β
δβ  and 
6
1
2
2 108112.8
1
2
−
− ×=−= βδβ ICA .  In other words, the microgrid should install a 500 kWe DG 
unit only if the natural gas generation cost decreases to US$0.077334/kWhe.  As illustrated in 
Fig. 1, the value to retain the option to invest in DG is greater than the net present value (NPV) 
of the cost savings from installed DG as long as the natural gas cost is greater than 
US$0.077334/kWhe.  At IC , the value of the option is exactly equal to the NPV of cost savings, 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 2β  is simply the negative root of the characteristic quadratic equation  ( ) ( ) 012
1 2 =−−+− rr βδββσ . 
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thereby triggering investment.  Note that ( )CV0  is defined only over ICC ≥  since the option to 
invest is exercised for any generation cost below the threshold value.  Thus, the difference 
between the two curves is the value of waiting for more information by delaying investment, 
which is also the opportunity cost of investment.  Performing sensitivity analysis as in Fig. 2 by 
varying the value of σ , ceteris paribus,7 illustrates that the investment threshold decreases with 
increasing σ , thereby signifying an increase in the value of the option to invest stemming from a 
greater value of waiting when there is more uncertainty. 
 
For comparison, a completely deterministic evaluation of this investment opportunity 
recommends waiting until the natural gas generation cost drops to  0956.0det =−+=
Q
rI
Q
XPCI  
before installing DG.8  This is because the deterministic DCF decision rule is to invest as long as 
the NPV of the active DG unit is non-negative: 
Q
rI
Q
XPC
Q
I
rQ
X
r
P
r
C
Q
I
rQ
X
r
C
r
P
I −+=⇒
−+≤⇒
≥−+−
det
0
                                                    (10) 
Intuitively, Eq. (10) states that investment under certainty occurs if the cost of on-site generation 
plus the amortised investment cost per kWhe of the DG unit is less than the electricity price and 
the customer charge per kWhe.  Since this approach neglects the opportunity cost of waiting9 
                                                 
7 Technically, since δ  depends on σ , it should also be varied with σ .  However, it is kept constant here simply to 
illustrate the sensitivity of IC  on σ . 
8  This is the same answer if one uses 000001.0=σ  in the expression for IC . 
9 As mentioned earlier, there is a value from waiting that is included in the real options approach.  Once the 
investment opportunity is exercised, this value is no longer available.  Hence, it is an opportunity cost to investing 
since it is an implicit cost that is added on to the direct investment cost, I , which then postpones investment 
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before investing, it suggests investing sooner than the real options approach.  Consequently, the 
value of the investment opportunity according to the DCF approach at 10.00 == PC  is 
1107.00 −=−+−
Q
I
rQ
X
r
C
r
P , whereas with the real options approach it is 
( ) 1533.020200 == βCACV .  Thus, a microgrid would not be willing to invest now in DG via the 
deterministic DCF approach, but may do so in the future if it uses the real options one. In the 
next section, we examine how may be facilitated by consideration of operational flexibility. 
 
3.2. Case 2:  Operational Flexibility and the Option to Disconnect 
Typically, DG units have the capability to be turned on and off at a cost in response to the 
natural gas cost.  Furthermore, if the natural gas generation cost decreases sufficiently, then the 
microgrid may consider disconnecting from the utility altogether in order to save on customer 
charges.  We now investigate the options to shut down and re-start the installed DG unit at costs 
S  and R  (both in US$), respectively, as well as the option to disconnect permanently from the 
utility.  We, thus, have four states in this system as opposed to two in Section 3.1: 
                                                                                                                                                             
exercise. 
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0. DG is not installed 
1. DG is installed and operational with utility connection available 
2. DG is installed and switched off with utility connection available 
3. DG is installed and operational without utility connection 
In state 0, the PV of the microgrid’s cost savings is simply the following:10 
( ) 220 βCACV F=                                                       (11) 
In state 1, the microgrid may exercise the option to suspend DG operation if the cost of natural 
gas generation becomes sufficiently high relative to the price of utility-provided electricity.  
Alternatively, if the cost of natural gas generation decreases sufficiently relative to P , then the 
microgrid may exercise the option to disconnect permanently from the utility.  Otherwise, if it 
operates the DG unit, then it obtains the PV of cost savings relative to utility electricity 
purchases.  Therefore, the PV of the microgrid’s cost savings in the second state is: 
 ( ) δββ
C
r
PCBCBCV −++= 21 211                                           (12) 
Here, 01 >B , 02 >B ,  ( ) ( ) 12405.522
1
2
1
2
2
221 >=+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−+−−= σσ
δ
σ
δβ rrr , and 2405.42 −=β  
(as in Section 3.1) are constants, with 1B  and 2B  endogenous to the system.  Note that the first 
term of Eq. (12) is the option to shut down, which becomes more valuable as the natural gas 
generation cost increases, the second term is the option to disconnect, which becomes more 
valuable as the natural gas generation cost decreases, and the remaining terms comprise the PV 
of cost savings per kWhe from using DG rather than utility purchases.    
 
                                                 
10 The superscript refers to a case with flexibility in order to distinguish the coefficient from that in Section 3.1. 
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In a suspended state, the microgrid’s PV of cost savings reflects the option to re-start: 
( ) 222 βCDCV =                                                       (13) 
Again, 02 >D  is an endogenous constant, and Eq. (13) indicates that when DG operation is 
suspended, the microgrid does not accrue any cost savings and re-starts the DG unit when the 
cost of natural gas generation decreases sufficiently.  Finally, from the operational state, the 
microgrid may also choose to disconnect permanently from the utility should the cost of natural 
gas generation drop significantly.  If it exercises this option, then the PV of its costs savings is 
similar to that in state 1 from the previous numerical example: 
 ( )
rQ
XC
r
PCV +−= δ3                                                     (14) 
Given the value functions in Eqs. (11), (12), (13), and (14), we also require the following value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions (as well as the ones in Eqs. (8) and (9)) describing 
transitions among the states11:   
( ) ( )
Q
SCVCV SS −= 21                                                    (15) 
( ) ( )SS CVCV 21 ′=′                                                      (16) 
( ) ( )
Q
RCVCV RR −= 12                                                    (17) 
( ) ( )RR CVCV 12 ′=′                                                      (18) 
( ) ( )XX CVCV 31 =                                                      (19) 
( ) ( )XX CVCV 31 ′=′                                                      (20) 
                                                 
11 The intuition behind these is similar to that for Eqs. (8) and (9). 
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These eight equations may be solved numerically for the following eight unknowns:  the four 
endogenous constants FA2 , 1B , 2B , and 2D , along with the investment threshold cost with 
operational flexibility, FIC , the shutdown and re-start threshold costs, SC  and RC , respectively, 
and the disconnection threshold cost, XC . 
 
Since the resulting system of equations is highly non-linear, there is no analytical solution to it.  
Nevertheless, for 5000== RS  and the parameters in Table 1, we numerically obtain 
5
2 100721.1
−×=FA , 450851 =B , 92 10712.1 −×=B , 52 104896.1 −×=D , 085.0=FIC , 
104.0=SC , 096.0=RC , and 038.0=XC .12  Note that IFI CC > , i.e., investment is accelerated 
due to operational flexibility.  These results imply that operational flexibility makes it easier for 
the microgrid to invest by increasing the NPV of an installed DG unit since the microgrid could 
always revert to utility purchases in case of sustained increases in the natural gas generation 
cost.  In addition, the microgrid waits until the natural gas generation cost is well above (below) 
P  before turning off (on) the DG unit.  This reflects not only the explicit cost S  ( R ) of turning 
off (on) an active (inactive) DG unit, but also the implicit cost R  ( S ) that the microgrid incurs 
in the future if it ever re-starts (shuts down) an inactive (active) DG unit.  In effect, the microgrid 
wants to avoid a situation in which it turns off (on) a marginally unprofitable (profitable) unit 
only to have to turn it back on (off) again shortly.  Although the option to disconnect is 
                                                 
12 It should be noted that the shutdown and re-start costs are estimated using the annual variable operating and 
maintenance (O&M) cost for this DG unit as follows:  560,52$5008760012.0$ USkWh
kWh
US
e
e
=⋅⋅ .  In other 
words, the approximate annual incremental O&M costs of this DG unit assuming constant output at rated capacity is 
US$50,000.  Since the optimal operating strategy of the microgrid is not known in advance, it is not clear how this 
additional amount should be allocated to each shutdown and re-start decision.  As a convention, we assume that, on 
average, there will be ten such decisions during a year, which yields 5000=S  and 5000=R  as additional costs 
associated with operational flexibility.   
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available, it does not seem likely to be exercised in the short term because the PV of its benefit, 
i.e., the cost savings from not having to pay the utility’s customer charge, is outweighed by the 
option to buy electricity from the utility in the event of natural gas generation cost increases.  
Therefore, the disconnection cost threshold is set much lower than P ;  effectively, the microgrid 
must expect sustained positive cash flows from DG operation in the future before exercising the 
disconnection option.   
 
Fig. 3 illustrates the value of the re-start option along with ( )CV0  and ( )CV1 .  Again, we draw 
the curves only over the regions in which they are defined.  Specifically, ( )CV0 , ( )CV1 , ( )CV2 , 
and ( )CV3  exist over FICC ≥ , XS CCC ≥≥ , RCC ≥ , and XCC ≥ , respectively.  Since XC  is 
very low, neither it nor ( )CV3  is indicated on the graph.  We observe from Eqs. (12) and (14) 
that  ( )CV1   is almost linear, i.e., similar to ( )CV3 , for low C , and then resembles the option to 
re-start, ( )CV2 , for intermediate C .  Furthermore, at each threshold price, the discontinuous 
jump between the appropriate curves is equal to the fixed cost per kWhe of switching states.  For 
example, at FIC , it is optimal to invest in the DG unit, i.e., jump from curve ( )CV0  to ( )CV1 , at 
which point the difference between the two curves reflects the investment cost per kWhe.  
 
As indicated in Section 3.1, greater uncertainty also makes the microgrid more hesitant to act, 
whether to invest, suspend, re-start, or disconnect.  Fig. 4 illustrates the effect of natural gas 
generation cost volatility on the relevant thresholds, where we again treat δ  and σ  as 
independent parameters.  In particular, greater volatility at a relatively high natural gas cost not 
only increases the option value to invest, but also delays investment as the microgrid waits for 
the natural gas cost to fall sufficiently in order to ensure that any cost decrease is sustainable.  In 
fact, the microgrid becomes more likely to face extremely high and unbounded costs while 
16 
simultaneously experiencing extremely low, but bounded (by zero), costs.  Since the effect of the 
former is stronger than that of the latter, the microgrid is more reluctant to invest.  Therefore, 
higher natural gas cost volatility makes investment in DG both more valuable and less likely.13  
This also has the effect of delaying any decision to suspend DG operation because the implicit 
reward of shutting down, i.e., the option to re-start DG, increases with natural gas volatility.  
Similarly, disconnecting completely from the utility becomes highly improbable for even a 
moderate level of volatility.  Hence, there is a wider zone of inaction as volatility increases. 
 
 
3.3. Case 3:  Stochastic Electricity Price 
Although end-use consumers in California do not currently face real-time (volatile) electricity 
prices, they did for a few months in the years 1999 and 2000 (see [17]).  We model this 
perturbation by allowing the electricity price to evolve according to a GBM process as follows: 
PPP PdzPdtdP σα +=                                                         (21) 
In addition, we assume that Pδ  is the convenience yield on electricity and that the electricity 
price has instantaneous correlation dtρ  with the cost of natural gas generation, which may be 
very high if natural gas figures prominently in the overall generation fuel mix.  Indeed, in 
California, almost 38% of the electricity generated uses natural gas as its fuel (see [18]).  
Proceeding analogously to Section 3.1, we construct a risk-free portfolio by using the option to 
invest in DG, ( )CPF , , along with short positions on both P  and C .  Letting 
C
Pp ≡  , 
( ) ( )pCfCPF =, , and assuming the option value is homogeneous14 in ( )CP, , we obtain the 
following ODE (see the Appendix for details): 
                                                 
13 The DG investment opportunity is similar to a put option on natural gas generation, which increases in value with 
the volatility of the underlying asset since this makes extremely low prices more probable. 
14 This is permissible as long as the NPV of the active investment depends only on P  and C .  In order to ensure 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 02
2
1 222 =−′−+′′+− pfpfppfp PPP δδδσσρσσ                       (22) 
The closed-form solution to this after applying the value-matching and smooth-pasting 
conditions ( ) δδ
1−=
P
I
I
ppf  and ( )
P
Ipf δ
1=′ , respectively, is ( ) 11 γpapf = , where 
( )δγ
δγ
11
1
−=
P
Ip  is the investment threshold ratio, 
PIp
a δγ γ 111 1
1
−= , and 
( ) ( )
1
2
42
1 >−−+−−= s
suststγ , using the constants 
2
2 22 σσρσσ +−≡ PPs , Pt δδ −≡ , and 
δ−≡u .  This is analogous to the solution to the ODE in Eq. (6) of Section 3.1 except that the 
boundary condition implies that the option value is increasing in the underlying variable, p .   
 
Using a deterministic electricity price as in Section 3.1 indicates that for 10.0=P , the 
investment cost threshold is 0809.0=IC  and 52 101172.1 −×=A , whereas the model with a 
stochastic electricity price reveals 0867.0=IC  for 03.0=Pσ  and 80.0=ρ  (see Figs. 5 and 6).  
For the latter, we obtain 545.71 =γ , 3066.11 =a , and 1528.1=Ip , and the corresponding option 
values to invest in the two cases given an initial natural gas generation cost equal to P  are 
US$0.85M and US$0.57M, respectively.  Intuitively, relatively low volatility in P  along with 
high ρ  reduces the scope for large cost savings from DG operation, thereby making it more 
attractive to invest sooner when both prices are stochastic. Relative to the case with a 
deterministic electricity price, when C  decreases here, P  also decreases, but relatively slightly, 
which cuts the cost savings from on-site generation.  Conversely, when PC > , the losses from 
on-site generation are reduced.  However, since only savings from on-site generation are 
bounded, they are more affected;  hence, this  reduces the option value of waiting.   
                                                                                                                                                             
this, we set both the turnkey cost of the unit and the utility customer charge equal to zero. 
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In contrast, when P  is relatively volatile, there is greater chance of both exceptionally high and 
low cost savings from DG operation.  In this case, it is beneficial for the microgrid to wait 
longer.  Here, if C  decreases, then P  also decreases, but to a greater extent (reflecting its larger 
relative volatility), which results in economic losses from distributed generation investment that 
are bounded as P  cannot become negative.  Alternatively, if C  increases, then P  also increases 
by a relatively greater amount, which results in savings from on-site generation that are 
unbounded as P  can conceivably increase without limit.  Consequently, this greater relative 
uncertainty increases the option value of the DG investment opportunity.  For example, if 
12.0=Pσ , then 0753.0=IC , and the option value to invest is US$1.14M (see Fig. 7).    Finally, 
using the value for Ip , we create an investment threshold boundary to indicate the highest 
possible natural gas generation cost that permits DG investment for each level of electricity price 
(see Fig. 8).  As  Pσ  increases, ceteris paribus, the slope of the boundary increases, thereby 
reducing the size of the region in which investment is optimal.     
 
                              
4. SUMMARY 
The ongoing deregulation of electricity industries worldwide provides scope for more 
decentralised decision-making as a means towards improving economic efficiency in electricity 
provision.  To the extent that policymakers seek to create incentives for market participants to 
act in a socially beneficial manner, they should aim to achieve outcomes in which energy 
resources are utilised consistent with their relative marginal values, inclusive of environmental 
footprint.  In a competitive regime, however, market participants should also account for price 
risk when making decisions, a dimension that was largely absent in the era of price-regulated 
vertical integration in both electricity and natural gas supply.  As we indicate in Section 3.1, 
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there is a loss in investment value from neglecting the managerial flexibility in decision-making 
under uncertainty.  Therefore, the standard DCF approach for analysing investment and 
operations should be either modified or replaced by techniques that explicitly factor in the roles 
of price volatility and managerial discretion.   
 
This paper takes a real options approach to analyse the investment and operational decisions of a 
California microgrid.  Threshold fuel costs are derived for triggering investment in DG, 
suspending and re-starting DG operations, and disconnecting from the electricity utility 
altogether.   First, in the case without operational flexibility, the DG investment opportunity is 
worth more with the real options approach than with the deterministic DCF one.  Indeed, even if 
it is not worthwhile to proceed with DG installation immediately, the right to make such an 
investment is more attractive once managerial discretion under uncertainty is considered.  As a 
sensitivity analysis, increasing the natural gas generation cost volatility decreases the investment 
threshold subsequently since the opportunity cost of killing the option to wait is also greater 
when there is more uncertainty.   
 
Next, it is observed that greater operational flexibility makes DG investment more attractive for 
the microgrid, while the disconnection option is exercised only in the rare case of sustained 
natural gas cost decreases.  Due to the fixed shutdown and re-start costs, it is optimal for the 
microgrid to suspend (re-start) the DG unit only when the natural gas generation cost rises above 
(falls below) the electricity price.  Again, sensitivity analysis with the natural gas generation cost 
volatility provides some insight:  more uncertainty in the system causes the microgrid to wait 
longer before making operational changes as it would not want to turn off (on) a marginally 
unprofitable unit only to have to turn it back on (off) shortly thereafter.  More profoundly, as the 
natural gas generation cost volatility increases, it increases the value of the shutdown (re-start) 
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option;  however, this also increases the opportunity cost of shutting down (re-starting), thereby 
making it optimal to delay the action.  An extension to the basic model to permit stochastic 
electricity prices (positively correlated with natural gas generation costs) indicates that relatively 
low volatility in electricity prices increases immediate investment in DG as the microgrid has 
less chance of sustained cost saving increases from waiting longer.  Conversely, highly volatile 
electricity prices decrease immediate investment as the microgrid is able to increase cost savings 
by waiting. 
 
Although it is not possible to verify or refute our findings quantitatively, their qualitative 
insights have practical bearing for commercial and industrial consumers in a large, deregulated 
jurisdiction such as California.  For example, a case study performed for Joseph Gallo Dairy 
Farms of Atwater, CA indicates that the 700 kWe of on-site generation currently in operation 
would not have been economical without subsidies, a methane digester for producing biogas 
(used as fuel instead of propane), or the opportunity to proceed with the investment in stages 
(see [19]).  This outcome highlights the importance of incorporating managerial flexibility in the 
planning stage as well as the risk from facing volatile fuel prices.  Since both are features of the 
real options approach, we feel that it may provide more meaningful insights into the behaviour 
of microgrids than the standard DCF one.   
 
While the analysis conducted here is purely economic, it should be noted that the diffusion of 
emerging microgrid technologies will likely be determined as much by the regulatory 
environment as by economic fundamentals.  Indeed, analysing, designing, and permitting actual 
microgrids will be a lengthy and costly process, which also adds a great deal of uncertainty to 
project costs.  Thus, we recognise that a project financial analysis is no more than an early step 
along the long road to project commissioning. Actual systems will require considerable 
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engineering as well as legal and regulatory work before real-world viability could be fully 
assessed.  Nevertheless, in this paper, we have endeavoured to identify the loss in value when 
risk and uncertainty are not accounted for as well as to explicate the changes in decision-making 
that should be considered relative to the deterministic DCF approach.  Given economic 
uncertainty in other energy sectors, we believe that the approach outlined here would be 
appropriate in those settings as well since it enables decision-makers to consider the benefits of 
timing and operational flexibility in mitigating price or cost risk.  For future work, we intend to 
examine incremental investment under uncertainty in a portfolio of alternatively sized DG 
technologies by a microgrid (see, for example, [20] , [21], and [22]) as well as the options to 
upgrade to CHP-enabled DG units and to sell electricity back to the grid or to nearby consumers. 
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APPENDIX 
Here, we derive the value of the option to invest in a DG unit without operational flexibility or 
turnkey costs when there is uncertainty in both the electricity price and the marginal cost of 
natural gas generation.  As in Section 3.1, we construct a risk-free portfolio, Φ , by using the 
option to invest in DG, ( )CPF , , along with short positions on both P  and C : 
CFPFF CP −−=Φ                                                   (A-1) 
Totally differentiating Eq. (A-1) implies: 
dCFdPFdFd CP −−=Φ                                                (A-2) 
Applying Itô’s Lemma, we obtain:  
( ) ( ) dPdCFdCFdPFdCFdPFdF PCCCPPCP ++++= 22 2
1
2
1                 (A-3) 
We next substitute Eq. (A-3) into Eq. (A-2) and take expectations: 
( ) ( )
[ ] dtPCFdtCFdtPFdE
dPdCFdCFdPFd
PPCCCPPP
PCCCPP
ρσσσσ ++=Φ⇒
++=Φ
2222
22
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
              (A-4) 
From the no-arbitrage condition, the instantaneous risk-free return on an investment of amount 
Φ  must equal the expected appreciation of Φ  less any dividend payments: 
[ ] dtCFdtPFdEdtr CPP δδ −−Φ=Φ                                   (A-5) 
Substituting Eqs. (A-1) and (A-4) into Eq. (A-5), we obtain: 
( ) ( ) 0
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2222
2222
=−−+−+++⇒
−−++=−−
rFCFrPFrPCFCFPF
CFPFPCFCFPFCrFPrFrF
CPPPPCCCPPP
CPPPPCCCPPPCP
δδσρσσσ
δδσρσσσ
   (A-6) 
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By using the change of variables 
C
Pp ≡  , ( ) ( )pCfCPF =, , and assuming the option value is 
homogeneous in ( )CP, , we convert the PDE in Eq. (A-6) into the following ODE (see [13]): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 02
2
1 222 =−′−+′′+− pfpfppfp PPP δδδσσρσσ                       (A-7) 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
Figure 1.  Value of Investment Opportunity for 06.0=σ   (Case 1). 
Figure 2.  Investment Threshold Cost (Case 1). 
Figure 3.  Value of Investment Opportunity for 06.0=σ   (Including Options to Shutdown, Re-
start, and Disconnect). 
Figure 4.  Investment, Shutdown, Re-start, and Disconnection Cost Thresholds. 
Figure 5.  Value of Investment Opportunity (Deterministic Electricity Price and Zero Turnkey 
Cost). 
Figure 6.  Value of Investment Opportunity (Low-Volatility Stochastic Electricity Price and Zero 
Turnkey Cost). 
Figure 7.  Value of Investment Opportunity (High-Volatility Stochastic Electricity Price and 
Zero Turnkey Cost). 
Figure 8.  Investment Threshold Boundary for High-Volatility Stochastic Electricity Price. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Base Case Parameter Values. 
Parameter Value 
P  US$0.10/kWhe 
I  US$0.50M 
8760
Q  500 kWe 
X  US$600 
σ  0.06 
δ  0.04 
r  0.04 
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